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ABSTRACT

This article looks at the question of the applicability of copyright law to the protection
of databases. It features a detailed discussion of the EU Database Directive, which is
the only comparable legal framework for the protection of databases. It then discusses
some problems that the EU Directive encounters vis-à-vis public interest concerns,
and outline why the EU Directive is unable to strike the right balance, both in principle
and in practice. Next, it briefly studies database protection law as it exists in the
United States, Australia, Canada and finally India, following which the need for
protection of databases in India is assessed. Finally, a basic alternative framework for
the legal protection of databases is proposed, seeking to balance the interests of database
generators and those of the public at large. The authors argue that databases should be
protected with reference to principles of the law of unfair competition, which recognizes
that a balance needs to be struck between the interests of owners and the public. The
authors also suggest the registration of databases with a governmental authority (similar
to the trademark registration process) so as to properly delineate the scope of commercial
exploitation that the database owner intends. Further, an argument is made for
compulsory licensing provisions.
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I. INTRODUCTION

“Increasingly, the central question is becoming who will have access to
the information these machines must have in storage to guarantee that
the right decisions are made.”
- Jean-Francois L
yotard1
Lyotard

1

JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POST-MODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 15 (Manchester
University Press, 1984).
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In his classic treatise The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard referred to the
phenomenon of the transfer of decision-making from administrators to machines,
and also of the concentration of information in the hands of a few. In a certain
sense, his apocalyptic vision of capitalism and societal transformation has proved
to be prophetic, and it is certainly an issue that ails the information society as it
stands today.
Over the last decade or so, the growing importance of raw and applied
information in commerce has made the protection of databases a contentious
issue across the globe. We live in an ‘information society’, in which the
importance of information is paramount. As Ilkka Rahnasto puts it,2 in
agricultural societies, land was most important; in industrial societies, labour
and machines became important; and finally, in information societies,
information has become the most important resource.3
What has put database protection on the policy agendas of most developed
economies (and India’s), has been the ease with which technology has allowed
the profligate spread of databases (along with their information), and, ironically,
a corresponding increase in unauthorised access to these databases. This spread
of technology has also increased the ease with which data may be copied. If
hard work was ever at any point a deterrent to copying a database, it has suffered
a well-deserved rout through the spread of technology coupled with the
ubiquitous use of technology for copying and replication. The United States
Supreme Court declared over a decade ago that the facts or information within
databases or compilations could not be the subject-matter of copyright.4 Three
essential approaches to improve the protection of information have emerged in
the past half-century or so, the first based on an absorption of ‘low authorship’
productions, as it were; the second being a Nordic sui generis model based on a
copyright model that prevented the wholesale appropriation of data; and finally,
a tort-misappropriation model.5
2

3

ILKKA RAHNASTO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, EXTERNAL EFFECTS, AND ANTI-TRUST LAW: LEVERAGING
IPRS IN THE COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 50 (Oxford University Press, 2003).

Id.

4

Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 US 340 (1991).

5

J.H. Reichman, Database Protection in a Globalised Economy, REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT ECONOMIQUE
- 2/3 (t. XVI) (2002), available at http://www.cairn.info/article_p.php?ID_REVUE
=RIDE&ID_NUMPU (last visited Nov. 29, 2007).
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The European Union, in its efforts to harmonize and provide greater
protection for intellectual property in data, passed the EU Database Directive,6
which allowed the information within a database to be protected under a new
sui generis right. At a theoretical level, it would be pertinent to look at the
reasons for copyright in general versus the copyrighting of databases in particular
(in the form of a sui generis regime). The underlying rationale of copyright law
in general has been to promote the making of creative works. While the idea
behind copyright law is to provide an incentive to persons to produce creative
works by granting them a monopoly over their product, the idea behind granting
a sui generis protection to databases is more akin to a ‘real’ property right (in the
Lockean sense). So, we find that the rationale behind database protection is
that information is treated as ‘property per se’, as opposed to copyright in general,
where it is limited to ‘property with a purpose’.7 Under traditional copyright
law, the right in intellectual property was purposive in nature, meaning that
the association of the term ‘property’ with cultural production was merely a
fiction to grant protection to works produced by members of society.
The implication of the above discussion leads us to the ultimate question:
what, then, is the best way to protect databases? It is evident that the reason
behind the protection of a certain interest will significantly affect the manner
in which that interest is protected. The idea is that that the notion of originality
derives its sustenance from the question of human input.8 It is from this
fundamental thought, despite varying interpretations, that we notice the sense
of ‘fictionalised property’. It is a reward for input. This is quite separate from
treating databases as ‘property per se’. Copyright and database rights “may have
concepts in common but, if so, that is only because those concepts happen to
fit, not because a database is a species of copyright.”9 Further, if we understand
the distinction between ‘fictionalised property’, in the realm of copyright, and
‘property per se’, in the realm of database protection, it might lead us to the

6

Council Directive 96/9, March 11, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 (EC), available at http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/
infosoc/legreg/docs/ 969ec.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2007) [hereinafter EU Database Directive].

7

That purpose being to promote greater works to be produced for the benefit of the public.

8

Hasan A. Deveci, Databases: Is Sui Generis a Better Bet than Copyright?, 12 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 178,
182 (2004).

9

British Horseracing Board v William Hill, [2001] RPC 31, §23.
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notion that the use of copyright law to protect databases was merely a case of
square pegs and round holes (and only as long as the pegs were small enough to
fit in the holes).
It seems that if the law vests a right in a person, then it must be in the form
of either a property interest or a personal interest, as in the case of a tort.10
Then, the fundamental jurisprudential judgment must be to choose between a
‘property rule’ and a ‘liability rule’, as in that of misappropriation or unfair
competition.11
II. THE EU DA
TABASE DIRECTIVE
DAT
The European Union placed itself at the vanguard of the move towards
the legal protection of databases with the issuance of the Directive on the Legal
Protection of Databases,12 which not only included guidelines for the legal
protection of databases, but also enjoined European countries to pass municipal
legislation implementing its provisions.13
In 1988, the European Commission’s Green Paper on Copyright and the
Challenge of Technology: Copyright Issues Requiring Immediate Attention realised
the need for legislation to protect computer databases.14 Subsequent to the
Feist case,15 the EC made a proposal for such protection which was then
crystallised into the EU Database Directive,16 which came into force on January
1, 1998.

10

Raymond T. Nimmer and Patricia A. Krauthaus, Information as Property – Databases and Commercial
Property, 1 INT’L. J. L. & INFO. TECH. 3, 6 (1993).

11

J.H. Reichman and Paul Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent Developments and Their
Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793 (1999). See Guido Calabresi and A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 1089 (1972) (discussing the idea of property rules/entitlements and liability).

12

EU Database Directive, supra note 6.
Id. art. 16.
W.K Khong, National and Inernational Developments on Copyright and Rights in Databases, 6 MALAYSIAN
J. LIB. & INFO. SCIENCE 71, 72 (2001).
Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 US 340 (1991).
EU Database Directive, supra note 6.

13
14

15
16
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The EU Directive defines a database as “a collection of independent works,
data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and
individually accessible by electronic or other means.”17 Consequently, the
Directive covers compilations of data in both traditional ‘hard copy databases’
and ‘electronic databases’.18 However, the Directive limits this protection by
providing that it would not apply to “computer programs used in the making or
operation of databases accessible by electronic means”.19 Such exclusion makes
it clear that the protection under this Directive only focuses on the database’s
structure and the contents contained therein.
The EU Database Directive provides for a dual (or two-tier) system for
database protection, comprising:
•

Copyright protection for the structure of the database (covering creative
databases); and

•

Sui generis protection for the contents of the database (covering non-creative
databases).20
These two systems stand independently of each other.

A. Copyright protection under the Directive
The copyright provisions in the Directive have been placed in Chapter 2.
The Directive explicitly notes that “the copyright protection of databases
provided for by this Directive shall not extend to their contents and shall be
without prejudice to any rights subsisting in those contents themselves.”21 By
virtue of this provision, the EU tried to harmonize the scope of copyright
protection granted to databases with sui generis protection for their contents.

17
18
19
20

21

EU Database Directive, supra note 6, art. 1.2.
Id. art. 1.1.
Id. art. 1.3.
See Yijun Tian, Reform of Existing Database Legislation and Future Database Legislation Strategies:
Towards a Better Balance in the Database Law, 31 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 347 (1998).
EU Database Directive, supra note 6, art 3.2.
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The Directive also provides for a common standard of originality. Article
3.1 provides that protection must be afforded to databases if they, “by reason of
the selection or arrangement of contents, constitute the author’s own intellectual
creation.”22 This standard is very similar to the standard of originality set up by
the United States Supreme Court in the Feist case.23 This standard of originality,24
as will be discussed later, is much higher than the ‘sweat of the brow’ standard
followed in most other common law jurisdictions.25 Consequently, creative
originality has become the sole rule by which a database will be entitled to the
protection of the copyright provisions of the Directive.26
The Directive provides for a set of ‘restricted acts’ and ‘exceptions to
restricted acts’.27 The restricted acts are similar to those under traditional
copyright law, and include reproduction, adaptation, distribution,
communication and display or performance to the public.28 The exceptions
that have been provided under Article 6.1 of the Directive include mandatory
exceptions, which allow lawful users to engage in any restricted act “which is
necessary for the purposes of access to the contents of the database and normal
use of the contents.” Article 15 of the Directive explicitly provides that any
contractual provision contrary to the exception mentioned in Article 6.1 shall
be ‘null and void’.29 The Directive further provides for certain non-mandatory
exceptions, which are:

22
23
24
25
26

27
28
29

EU Database Directive, supra note 6, art 3.1.
Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 US 340 (1991).
Id. at 350.
Supra note 19, at 356.
EU Database Directive, supra note 6, art 3.1. Article 3.1 of the Directive provides that “in accordance
with this Directive, databases which, by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents,
constitute the author’s own intellectual creation shall be protected as such by copyright. No other
criteria shall be applied to determine their eligibility for that protection.” Some commentators have
pointed out that “the Directive requires a ‘modicum of creativity’ and leaves to the Member State
Legislatures and the European Court of Justice, the further development of the creativity standards.”
Id. See Julie Wald, Legislating the Golden Rule: Achieving Comparable Protection under the European
Union Database Directive, 25 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 987, 1007 (2002).
EU Database Directive, supra note 6, art 6.
Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 15.
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•

Reproduction for private purposes of a non-electronic database;

•

Illustration for teaching or scientific research;

•

Use for the purposes of public security or an administrative or judicial
procedure; and

•

Other traditional exceptions authorised under national law.30

In addition, the Directive also provides a general limitation for the
application of all the above exemptions (both mandatory and non-mandatory).
It provides that the application of these exemptions should not “unreasonably
prejudice the right holder’s legitimate interests or conflict with normal
exploitation of the database.”31 Even though these exceptions are in existence,
as Tian notes,32 they are narrower than the exceptions under traditional
copyright, as the exceptions with relation to criticism, comment, news reporting
and personal use in case of electronic databases are missing.33
The period of protection provided within the Copyright portion of the
Directive is similar to a traditional copyright, which extends to a period of 70
years beyond the death of the author.34
B. Sui Generis protection under the Directive
Chapter 3 of the EU Directive contains a property model of database
protection which is analogous to, yet quite separate from, copyright protection.35
It treats a database as property, in respect of which the owner has some exclusive
rights and the right to assign, transfer or license those rights.36 Databases, as has
already been mentioned, are defined broadly as “a collection of independent
30
31
32
33
34

35

36

EU Database Directive, supra note 6, art 6.2(a)-(d).
Id. art. 6.2(d)(1).
Yijun Tian, supra note 20, at 368.
Id.
EU Database Directive, supra note 6, art 2(c). This article limits the scope of the Directive with respect
to the term of the Copyright Protection.
EU Database Directive, supra note 6, art. 13. See also Mark J. Davison, Sui Generis or Too Generous?,
21 UNIV. NEW SOUTH WALES L.J. 735 (1998).
EU Database Directive, supra note 6, art 7.1.
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works, data or other materials arranged in a systematic or methodical way and
accessible by electronic or other means.”37 The maker of the database, who has
made a substantial investment in the obtaining, verification, or presentation of
contents, is given two exclusive rights in respect of that database. These are the
rights of ‘extraction’ and ‘re-utilization’.38 Article 7(1) provides that the exclusive
rights of ‘extraction’ and ‘re-utilization’ are available to a database maker who
shows that “there has been qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial
investment in the obtaining, verification and presentation of the contents.”
This is essentially the crux of the sui generis right; it does away with any standard
of creativity. Originality is no longer a legal concern for the protection of the
database. It is sufficient that a quantitatively adducible ‘substantial investment’
has been made.39 It is here that we can infer that the status of the information
contained in the database is of ‘property per se’, as opposed to ‘property with a
purpose’.40
‘Extraction’ under the Directive is defined as “the permanent or temporary
transfer of all or a substantial part of the contents of a database to another
medium by any means or in any form.”41 ‘Re-utilization’ is defined as “any form
of making available to the public all or a substantial part of the contents of a
database by the distribution of the copies, by renting, by online or other forms
of transmission.”42 The right of re-utilization covers making the database available
to the public in any form, either by way of an electronic copy or by hard copy.
The right of extraction is analogous to the right of reproduction under copyright
law. The Directive, however, goes further and provides that even temporary
transfer to another medium will be an infringement.43
Article 7.5 provides that the database owner can even prevent the repeated
and systematic extraction and/or re-utilization of insubstantial parts of the
database, provided the extraction and/or re-utilization conflicts with the normal
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

EU Database Directive, supra note 6, art 1.2.
Id. art 7.1.
Id.
See generally supra note 2.
EU Database Directive, supra note 6, art. 7.2(a).
Id. art 7.2(b).
Id.
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exploitation of the database and/or unreasonably prejudices the legitimate
interests of the owner.44
The Directive, in effect, confers perpetual protection over the entire contents
of the database, at least as long as the database is updated. Therefore, we find
that although under the Directive, the period of protection is limited to 15
years,45 Article 10 goes on to say that “[T]he right provided for in Article 7 shall
run from the date of the completion of the making of the database. It shall
expire fifteen years from the first of January of the year following the completion
of the database.” Now, if this provision were to be read in conjunction with
Article 7, it would mean that any change in the database (whether qualitative
or quantitative) made by substantial investment would lead to the
commencement of a new term. In effect, this would grant perpetual protection
to databases. This is especially significant in the case of dynamic databases.46
Furthermore, this would also mean that protection would exist for those contents
of the database that were collected more than 15 years before the newest term
of protection.
The exceptions that have been provided under the Directive in relation to
the sui generis provisions are meagre, especially in light of what we have discussed
above regarding the duration of copyright. The provisions regarding the
exceptions are vague and provide little indication as to how they are to be
interpreted.47 Let us take an example; Article 9(b) of the Directive allows for
states to provide for the extraction of a substantial part of the contents of the
database “for the purpose of illustration for teaching and scientific research, as
long as the source is indicated and to the extent justified by the non-commercial
purpose to be attained.”48 What is interesting is that the scope of protection is
defined relatively clearly, but the exceptions are optional for implementing
countries, and the scope thereof has been left unclear.49
44
45
46

47
48
49

EU Database Directive, supra note 6, art. 7.5.
Id. art. 10.
Dynamic Databases are those databases whose contents are constantly updated. So, if a change in a
dynamic database amounts to substantial investment, the protection will be renewed on a constant
basis.
See Davison, supra note 35.
EU Database Directive, supra note 6, art 9(b).
Deveci, supra note 8, at 201.
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A general critique of the sui generis model of database rights is that it generates
a monopoly and could lead to the abuse of market position. In the Directive,
the fundamental problem is that it allows the abuse of market position for the
reason that “investors in database production can always deny third parties the
right to use pre-existing data in value adding application.”50 That, then,
inherently limits the scope of derivative works, unlike in copyright law,51 even
though the Directive includes a provision that the right granted thereunder
cannot be used to facilitate the abuse of a dominant market position. Joanna
Wu notes that there is a tension between competition principles and the sui
generis right.52 Furthermore, as Reichman puts it, this has potentially snuffed
out the idea of a public domain that itself was the justification for granting
interests in intangibles, as it were, from the start.53 Reichman and Samuelson
also point out that the most controversial objects of protection, that is raw data
or facts, have also, paradoxically, received the maximum protection for any sort
of intellectual property.54
III. THE DIRECTIVE BEFO
RE THE COUR
TS
BEFORE
COURTS
Before the definitive judgment of the European Court in British Horseracing
Board v. William Hill Organisation Ltd.,55 the interpretation of the EU Database
Directive came up before various domestic Courts in the EU. This section will
examine the cases that came up in Germany, the Netherlands and Britain.
A. Germany
The first case that came up in Germany regarding the interpretation of the
Directive was Tele-Info-CD,56 where Tele-Info-CD, which was a subsidiary of
50

J.H. Reichman and Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 81
(2001).

51

Id.
Xuqiong (Joanna) Wu, E.C. Database Directive, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 571, 585-586 (1994).
Reichman, supra note 5.
J.H. Reichman and Pamela Samuelson, supra note 50, at 94.
British Horseracing Board Ltd v William Hill Organisation Ltd., (C203/02) [2004] ECR I-10415
(ECJ).
Re Unauthorised Reproduction of Telephone Directories on CD-Rom Case, I ZR 99/66 [2000] ECC
433 (ECJ).

52
53
54
55

56
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Deutsche Telecom (DT), scanned and copied the telephone listings of DT
and published them on a CD-ROM. The German Federal Court held in an
earlier order that the listings amounted to mere technical organisation, which
was dictated by matters of efficiency and expediency. As such, the listings were
not covered by the law of copyright. In the meantime, the Directive came into
force in Germany, and the Court went on to hold that the listings were covered
under the Directive by virtue of there being substantial investment57 since the
contents were arranged systematically,58 and were capable of being accessed
individually, as they were arranged alphabetically.59
Another case that came up in Germany concerned the repeated extraction
of an insubstantial part of the database. In the StepStone case,60 there were two
competing online job agencies. The StepStone website allowed users to search
jobs industry-wise as well as geographically. OFIR put out their own job vacancies.
However, they also created deep links from their website into StepStone’s website.
OFIR did not dispute that StepStone’s website was a database, but argued that
since StepStone’s database was accessible to the public, OFIR had an implied
licence to deep link, and that additional platforms providing access to
StepStone’s website were, in fact, beneficial to StepStone.61 The Cologne
County Court held that deep linking, which bypassed StepStone’s homepage,
amounted to a repeated and systematic use of insubstantial parts of the database,
thereby infringing StepStone’s rights.62
B. The Netherlands and the Spin-Off Doctrine
In order to protect its database, the database maker must show that it has
made “qualitatively and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the
obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents.”63 So the question that
57

Re Unauthorised Reproduction of Telephone Directories on CD-Rom Case, I ZR 99/66 [2000] ECC
433 (ECJ), ¶ 36.

58

Id, ¶ 42.
Id.
StepStone v. OFIR.
Hasan A. Deveci, supra note 8, at 203.
Id.
Id.

59
60
61
62
63
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arose in the Dutch Courts was whether ‘spin-off’ databases are also entitled to
protection under the EU Directive. A ‘spin-off’ database is essentially one which
is the ‘by-product’ of another main activity of the producer of the database.64
The initial discussions over the ‘spin-off’ theory took place in the course of
legislative proceedings in the Dutch Parliament during the adoption of the EU
Database Directive.65
Dutch Courts were divided over this issue. In two cases, Denda v. KPN66
and KPN v. KSO,67 the Courts held that ‘spin-off’ databases were entitled to
protection primarily on the ground that the Directive does not make a distinction
between primary and secondary exploitation of databases. They said that it
would not make a difference whether or not the investment was made if
protection was not granted to the database.68
However, in De Telegraaf v. NOS,69 De Telegraaf had copied programme
listings from NOS which the latter claimed were protected under the sui generis
right, so as to publish its own TV guide. The Dutch Competition Authority
found that there was no substantial investment in the making of television
programmes by the Dutch public and commercial broadcasting organisations.
Programme schedules, according to the Competition Authority, were byproducts of the programme scheduling process. Therefore, the broadcasters could
not invoke database protection under the sui generis right, since there was no
substantial investment. The case was also being argued before the civil Courts.
The Court of Appeal of The Hague, applying the ‘spin-off’ theory, held that
the “broadcasters, whose primary task is to make radio and television programmes,
cannot accomplish this task without collecting the data on the programmes
and redacting the programme lists” and, therefore, “the mere editing/redacting
of the programmes does not show a (specific) substantial investment in time,
64

Estelle Derclaye, Database Sui Generis Right: Should We Adopt the Spin-off Theory?, 26(9) EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 402 (2004).

65

Id.
Denda v. KPN/PTT Telecom, [2001] AMI 69.
Kanttekening bij KPN v. XSO, [2000] 4 Informatierecht/AMI 71.
Supra note 52, at 404, as cited in S. Gijrath and B. Gorissen, Applying the Database Act to Online
Information Services: A Trial and Error Exercise, [2000-01] CW 26.
De Telegraaf v. NOS/HMG, (1999) 1 AMI 12.

66
67
68

69
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money or otherwise.”70 The Court of Appeal, on this point, specifically referred
to the Ministry of Justice’s statement in support of its findings. In the Kranten.com
case, 71 the Court held that a list of newspaper article headings on a website
does not represent a substantial investment. The publishers’ investment is
directed towards the gathering of reports and articles to fill the newspapers.
The headlines are invented and do not reflect a qualitative investment. In
other words, the Court did not expressly adopt the ‘spin-off’ theory, but it can
be concluded from the judgment that the selection of articles and the drafting
of the list of titles to be placed on the websites were a side issue of the business,
i.e. publishing printed newspapers.72
Clearly, the implication of the above discussion is that the EU Directive,
in substance, is fundamentally vague.73 Indeed, the Database Directive itself
does not make any reference to primary or secondary uses of databases.74
C. Britain and the European Court of Justice
The leading case that has come up for the interpretation of the EU Database
Directive is British Horse Racing Board v. William Hill Organisation Ltd.,75 which
was one of four cases that were referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ),
and then sent back to their respective jurisdictions for final consideration. The
aforementioned case affirmed the judgment of the ECJ in BHB v. William Hill
Organisation Ltd.76
The facts of the case are simple. The British Horse Racing Board (BHB)
was the regulatory authority for horse racing in England and, in pursuance of its
70

De Telegraaf v. NOS/HMG, [2001] AMI 73.

71

National Newspapers v. Eureka Internetdiensten V.O.F. and Others, [2000] AMI 205.

72

Supra note 52, at 405.
Xuqiong (Joanna) Wu, supra note 52, at 581.
Supra text accompanying notes 54 and 55. See P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Program Schedules, Event Data and
Telephone Subscriber Listings under the Database Directive: The ‘Spin-Off’ Doctrine in the Netherlands and
elsewhere in Europe (paper presented at Fordham University School of Law Eleventh Annual
Conference on International IP Law & Policy New York, 14-25 April 2003), available at http://
www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/spinofffordham.html (last visited Sep. 29, 2007).
[2005] EWCA Civ 863.
(C203/02) [2004] ECR I-10415 (ECJ).

73
74

75
76
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activities, it compiled an extensive database of information on horseracing,
which it gathered over a period of time. The BHB also checked whether the
horses and the riders met the eligibility requirements to be able to compete in a
race. BHB was, therefore, the sole source of the information and the only one
to know and confirm the final list of participants in a race. This information
was put into a database and was used by a wide variety of users such as racehorse
owners, trainers, riders, radio or television journalists and bookmakers. In this
case, data was supplied through two channels. First data was made available to
a joint venture company between Weatherby’s and the Press Association, which
forwarded the data to its subscribers in an electronic form called the ‘declaration
feed’. Following this, one of the subscribers supplied the data to its own subscribers
in the form of a so-called ‘raw data feed’. These two channels were necessary
for punters to place bets. Among the bookmakers was William Hill. William
Hill used the raw data feed for its horseracing, bet-making business.
BHB alleged infringement of its sui generis database right by William Hill
and filed a suit against William Hill in the English High Court, which was
decreed. Laddie, J. found that William Hill had violated Articles 7.1 and 7.5 of
the EU Database Directive.77 On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision
was referred to the ECJ. The ECJ accurately noted the reason for the introduction
of the Directive, saying that the idea behind it was to promote the creation of
storage and processing systems for already existing materials, and not for the
creation of the data itself.78
Now, protection for databases is only provided if the maker can show that
it has made a quantitatively or qualitatively substantial investment in “obtaining,
verifying or presenting” the contents of its database.79 The Court provided the
following guidelines in the interpretation of Article 7.1 of the Directive:80
1. “Investment in obtaining” does not mean creating. It does not include
resources used for the creation of independent materials. It means
investment in collecting the information.
77
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2. Investment in the “presentation of the contents of the database” deals with
the resources used for the purpose of giving the database its function of
processing information, establishing a systematic or methodical arrangement
of the materials contained in the database and organising their individual
accessibility. Once again, it does not deal with investment in the creation
of the materials contained in the database. This could also take into
consideration investments linked with the method used to allow the
database to fulfill its main function: the organisation of a set of information
to facilitate its access.81
3. Investment in “verification” covers those resources used to ensure the
reliability of the information contained in the database82 and to monitor its
accuracy. It does not cover resources used for the methodical or systematic
arrangement of the materials and the organisation of their individual
accessibility. Certification or registration is considered as creation
nonetheless, and they are not taken into account.
The Court held that one only needs to fulfill one of the above conditions
to secure the right under Article 7.1 of the Directive.83 With regard to the BHB
case, the Court held that investment in drawing up the list of the horses and
their riders did not constitute investment in the obtaining and the verification
of the contents of the database.84 We can see that by distinguishing between
obtaining and creating data, the ECJ has relied on the underlying arguments of
the ‘spin-off’ doctrine, even though the judgment does not explicitly refer to
it.85
However, the ECJ reiterated in all four cases that the fact of the maker of
the database being the same as the creator of the materials within that database
does not prima facie exclude the database from protection.86 So, what needs to
81
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be shown by the claimant in such a case is that substantial investment was
made in the obtaining, verification or the presentation of the contents of the
database, independent of the resources used in creating the information in the
database.87 One possible way to get around this situation is for the maker of the
contents to create a subsidiary company, license the information exclusively to
the subsidiary, and then let the licensee create the database.88
With regard to the meaning of ‘substantial investment’, the ECJ only notes
(in the BHB case, for example) that the investment required with regard to the
obtaining, verification and presentation of the contents of the database was
minimal (as opposed to the investment required to create the data).89
With regard to the ‘substantial part’ requirement necessary to constitute
infringement,90 consistent with the approach in traditional copyright law, the
ECJ judgment laid down that “it must be considered whether the human,
technical and financial efforts put in by the maker of the database in obtaining,
verifying and presenting those data constitute a substantial investment.”91 Under
copyright law, the requirement of originality determines the scope of the right
and the scope of infringement. Only if there is copying of what is ‘original’ will
there be infringement.92 Therefore, the Court found that there would have
been no infringement, as there was no substantial investment in the obtaining,
verification and presentation of the contents of the database.93
Lastly, with respect to indirect infringement, the Court held that a third
party could also commit infringement, but with the qualification that it would
not cover cases regarding mere consultation.94 According to Davison and
Hugenholtz, “the best interpretation that can be placed on this part of the
judgment is that once a database maker makes its database available to the
87
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public, it is implicitly consenting to the viewing of the database by any person
and that consent will cover any temporary copies made for that purpose.”95
One of the most trenchant criticisms levelled against the ECJ’s interpretation
of the Directive is that it renders the Directive worthless, since the ECJ
distinguished between ‘creating’ and ‘obtaining’, and preferred protection only
to the latter.96 Therefore, the possibility of the sui generis right being used for
protection, especially in view of the weak law of passing-off, would be rather
low.97 Indeed, one scholar has called the judgment “Europe’s Feist”.98 In relation
to the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the ECJ judgment,99where the Court
mentions that it is the official stamp of approval that changes the nature of data
from a mere collection of independent existing materials, it means that any
‘official’ database would not be entitled to the protection of the EU Database
Directive.100
Furthermore, the line between ‘verification’ and ‘creation’ is still blurred
and difficult to locate, though one possible solution may be in noting the time
of registration, where verification done after the date of registration will not fall
within the scope of the sui generis right.101 Davison and Hugenholtz raise two
further questions regarding the decision of the ECJ:102 first, that the Court did
not answer the argument raised by William Hill, which was basically that
infringement would only occur if they had copied the ‘databaseness’ of the
database of William Hill, as it already found that the contents taken were not
substantial;103 and second, that the Court failed to lay down any guidelines
95
96
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with respect to the term for protection of ‘dynamic databases’, which could end
up being perpetual.104
Even so, it is possible that the ECJ realised that the scope of the protection
that the Directive grants is extensive and unnecessary, and therefore whittled
down the scope of its conferment of rights.
IV
TABASE/COMPILA
TION PROTECTION IN
ABASE/COMPILATION
IV.. DA
DAT
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Other jurisdictions have not yet legislated any special laws in relation to
database rights, whether sui generis in nature or otherwise. We can, therefore,
briefly review the protection afforded to databases under ordinary copyright
law in three important jurisdictions, i.e. the United States, Canada and Australia,
before turning to the Indian position in conclusion.
A. The United States
The landmark case in relation to database protection in the US is Feist
Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,105 where the United States Supreme
Court held that the telephone listings of Rural Telephone did have the requisite
level of originality required for copyright protection. The Court overruled the
‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine of originality, replacing it with the ‘modicum of
creativity’ standard.106 The Court further said that copyright law only covered
the expression of facts and not the facts themselves, the latter being
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unconstitutional.107 The copyright in a factual compilation, according to the
Court, was ‘thin’.108
Over the years, the Supreme Court, while finding many databases
copyrightable109 due to the low level of creativity required, would hold that
there was no infringement as the defendants did not copy the selection or
arrangement of information in the database.110
Therefore, under copyright law, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to protect the information in a database. The other route that might be taken
in the US (albeit one that has remained unused) is the law of unfair competition.
The evolution of unfair competition concretised into a property-based model
in International News Service v. Associated Press.111 The misappropriation doctrine
may recognise a property right in the product of one’s investment, labour and
skill and prevent others from taking that product in a manner that constitutes
‘free-riding’.112 However, this doctrine has been severely limited by National
Basketball Association v. Motorola,113 which laid down that information could
be only be misappropriated if it was ‘time-sensitive’. The US has, so far, made
many unsuccessful attempts to legislate on database protection through the sui
generis route, through a tort/misappropriation model and through a modified
competition law model.114
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B. Canada
In Canada, a database enjoys protection as a compilation under copyright
law. There were a number of contradictory cases115 that came up before the
Court, some which took up the ‘sweat of the brow’ standard,116 some which
picked up the Feist-like ‘modicum of creativity’ standard117 and others which
stood somewhere in between.118
The CCH case,119 decided by the Supreme Court of Canada, is now the
final word on the law on originality. While there are varying interpretations of
the judgment with reference to the level of originality required,120 the Court
emphatically rules that facts are not copyrightable121which, in essence, means
that the position with relation to the copyrightability of facts remains the same
as in the US. So, protecting databases in Canada is also a very tough task under
the current legal regime.
C. Australia
Conversely, in Australia, the standard followed still belongs to the ‘sweat
of the brow’ lineage, which means that facts are copyrightable under the
Australian copyright regime. The leading case in this regard is Telstra,122 which
was decided by the Federal Court of Australia and later upheld by the High
Court of Australia.123 In Telstra, the Australian Courts emphatically rejected
the Feist standard of creativity and opted for the ‘sweat of the brow’ approach.
This was based on two reasons: first, that unlike the US, where the Constitution
and the Copyright Act of 1976 required originality, Australian copyright law
115
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required no intellectual effort; and second, that the Court noted that the
‘originality’ requirement was very low, leading to difficulties in applying the
standard.124 Hence, we can conclude that databases and the information
contained within them are still the subject of copyright law in Australia.
D. India
India does not have any separate legislation on the protection of databases.
Databases are covered under the Copyright Act, 1956, under the heading of
‘literary works’. Furthermore, India followed the common law doctrine of ‘sweat
of the brow’, as was the case in Burlington Home Shopping v. Rajneesh Chibber.125
However, in Navin J. Desai v. Eastern Book Company,126 the Court found that
there should be a ‘modicum of creativity’ involved in a compilation, and
therefore denied protection to case-notes published in Law Reports. In another
turn, in Infoseek Solutions v. Kerala Law Times,127 the Kerala High Court disagreed
with the judgment of the Delhi High Court, keeping in line with the sweat of
the brow standard.128 This dispute now appears to have been settled by the
recent Supreme Court decision in Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak,129
which effectively endorses the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in CCH.
This case dealt with the copyright status of legal reports, with special reference
to headnotes, footnotes, editorial notes, and other enhancements to the text of
court judgments. The Supreme Court followed the Canadian decision in striking
a balance between the extremes of ‘sweat of the brow’ and ‘modicum of
creativity’, holding that creativity is not required to render a work original.
What is required is an exercise of skill and judgment, which is seen as a balance
between creativity and the mere expenditure of labour and capital. 130
124
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Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the protection was extended to those
elements that required the exercise of skill and judgment, such as headnotes,
editorial notes, and comments such as ‘partly dissenting’, ‘concurring’, etc. It
did not extend to clerical corrections, syntax corrections, and other work deemed
to be merely clerical. This decision will be important in determining the extent
of database protection in India. Indeed, if the Supreme Court’s endorsement of
the CCH decision is taken to its logical conclusion, the protection of databases
will be a difficult task. However, the applicability of the decision to databases is
not yet clear.
V. A PROPOSAL
The questions that need to be answered are, simply, who or what one
wants to protect and for what reasons.131 To put it differently, the idea is to
identify a pressing need to protect a certain interest in a certain way. Database
legislation should be in pursuance of an institutional framework that seeks to
entrench the notions of competition, fair use and other related public interests,
while rewarding investment of database generators. We can summarise certain
arguments that have been made regarding a change from status quo under
different regimes. The underlying idea behind all these arguments is that the
proprietary interests in databases must be balanced against the free flow of
information. That is to say, the benefits to society in the absence of database
rights must be less than those available in the presence of a regime of database
protection.132 One argument that is certainly made in ‘modicum of creativity’
jurisdictions is that the protection awarded to databases is too little, as the US
Supreme Court (in Feist) pointed out that facts are not copyrightable.133
Although no empirical evidence has been put forth to show that databases, in
fact, need protection, proponents argue that providing databases with protection
will encourage investment in such databases.134 Even so, others argue that the
lack of empirical evidence of an existing market failure in relation to databases
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makes it difficult to ascertain the need for the regulation of database rights.135
Interesting counter-arguments that have been made try to prove that databases
are sufficiently protected under the law of misappropriation, reverse passing-off,
technological protection measures and contracts. In common law jurisdictions,
where the ‘sweat of the brow’ standard still applies, the argument against the
status quo has tried to show that this originality standard provides protection
that is too strong.136
It is argued by some that empirical evidence suggests that the EU is dragging
its feet with regard to modifying the sui generis right,137 as the positive economic
impact of the Database Directive remains unproved.138 Further, it is argued that
a sui generis right, combined with unfair competition law, technological
protection measures and restrictive licensing, will lead to market domination,
resulting in distortions in the market.139 Reichman and Uhlir argue that it makes
the creation of secondary markets, with respect to the information contained
in the database, prohibitive in terms of costs.140 The scientific community fears
that the cost of scientific research would surge upward.141
It is also interesting to note some of the prerequisites of the protection of
information as proposed by Wendy Gordon;142 These are that the incentive to
invest should be defended when: (1) the costs of developing an information
product are high; (2) the costs of copying are low; (3) copying yields a
substantially identical product; (4) which a copyist can price cheaply, not having
substantial research and development costs to recoup; and (5) when consumers,
135
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believing the two products are substantially identical, decide to purchase the
cheaper one, thereby inducing market failure because the first-comer is unable
to recoup its expenses; and (6) such a market failure could have been averted
by a period of protection that would allow the first-comer to recoup its expenses
and justify its investment in developing the information product.143
India’s position has been elucidated in a study conducted by WIPO in
2002.144 Interestingly, the study notes that 80% of the data generation in India
is by government agencies.145 This is possible due to the myriad functions and
activities performed by an erstwhile socialist state. Much of the scientific data
produced in India also comes from government-run institutions as, till recently,
most specialist research institutes in various fields were run by the government.
However, this is set to change, especially following the information technology
boom in India and increasing private R&D in pharmaceuticals and genetics.
The study notes that most private database companies are in favour of database
protection.146 Although the study elucidates the extremely strong protection
that databases already receive under copyright law, the Information Technology
Act, 2000, and the proposed change to the Copyright Act, introducing
protection of technological protection measures, the study also boldly proposes
the adoption of the EU Database Directive as a model for protection.147 In this
context, it is in India’s interest to have a balanced legislation protecting databases
and replacing the existing system of protection.
What we propose in this context is a law that takes certain elements from
trademark law and the law of unfair competition. The idea of taking these
specific elements, as will be made clear, is to ensure that the form of protection
in databases relates more to a liability rule rather than to a property rule and, in
that sense, it will try to get around the problem of square pegs and round holes.
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The idea is first (and in concomitance with Lipton)148 that database
protection should be limited only to those databases which are intended to be
put to commercial use. It is possible that questions may arise relating to mixed
uses of a database, i.e. when the purpose of the database is both scientific and
commercial. In such cases, protection should be afforded, for at the end of the
day, the purpose is commercial, even if only partially.
Second, to enforce the factum of commercial use, the law should mandate
that the database is actually put to commercial use in a specific period of time.
The effect of non-commercialisation of the database should result in the database
being denied protection under law. Lipton, however, considers and denotes
her model as a proprietary system.149 The ill-effects of a proprietary system may
not be reflected in legislation, as the dismissal of an ‘in-effect proprietary’ model
pays little heed to the way judges construe legislation. That is to say, the
conferment of property-type rights in databases changes the whole basis of
protection. What that does, in effect, is direct judges to construe law so as to
protect property where the scope and strength of protection is necessarily greater
than where one imposes liability rules. The notion of information as property is
inherently problematic.150 Subliminal and sub-legislative directions can
influence decisions greatly by providing them the necessary justification for
increasing the strength of protection, if the basis of protection were proprietary.
In fact, Lipton says that her model is an ‘addition’ to intellectual property law,
in the sense that it comes into play only where other forms of intellectual
property protection fail. This may very well be plausible in the US, where, after
the Feist decision, the protection granted to databases is thin. However, in
common law countries, where protection is already very strong, the need is to
properly streamline intellectual property policy which may (and we propose
that our suggested model does) supplant the current law, and does not supplement
or complement the existing law.
This, then, leads us to the question of limiting the scope of protection. In
relation to infringing conduct, the law should prohibit only that use of the
148
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database that will contribute to a decrease in the potential market share of the
database, that is to say, that infringing use must be commercial use. Therefore,
two conditions should be satisfied in relation to infringing conduct: first, that
the infringing conduct must be commercial; and second, that such commercial
use must have a potential adverse effect on the market share of the existing
claimant database. The idea behind the first condition is to balance and bring
into consideration the interests of the scientific and educational communities.
The idea behind the second is to ensure the interests of value-adding and
downstream commercial users. Obviously, the second condition should be
exempted for copying the databases of information providers per se. Information
providers limit their services to data generation only. But again, if such providers
should prove to enter into downstream uses themselves, then we revert to the
original conditions of infringing conduct, or possibly deny the database
protection altogether in relation to that downstream use as a stricter measure.
Therefore, this specifically relies on the model of unfair competition. It is
interesting to note that there are three reasons why the EU did not adopt the
unfair competition model.151 First, that a model that is based on unfair
competition does not create transferable economic interests.152 Second, that it
only applies to a competitor and not a user otherwise considered.153 Third,
unfair competition laws are not uniform across the EU.154
In the case of sole-source information generators and other cases where
raw data is very difficult to get, there should necessarily be a compulsory licensing
provision. This is necessary to ensure that abusive and oppressive licensing
terms are not evolved by such information providers. The grounds could be
similar to those provided under patent law.
The third idea is to create a register of databases, similar to that proposed
by Lipton155 and Mazumder,156 that is managed by a registration body. Two
151
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things need to be clarified here: first, the nature and functions of the registration
body, and second, the incidents of the registration. The purpose of this will
become clear after the following explanation. The registration body or,
alternatively, a Registrar, can possibly be of the same nature as that of the
Registrar of Companies under the Companies Act, 1956.157 The function of
the Registrar in this context is to ensure that the database so registered is not a
database copied from another one (therefore denying the protection of the
database law to those who have copied the data) and to administer compulsory
licensing terms. In terms of registration, the owner will have to specify the class
under which he wants to register his database at the time of registration, as is
done in the case of trademarks. The class can be dependent on the intended
commercial use of the database. The class ought to be specific, and the owner
should be able to register his database in more than one class, provided the
regulator has the power to strike down the registration in a particular class if the
owner does not exploit it within a reasonable time. This is to prevent owners
from uselessly and frivolously registering claims for intended commercial use.
The effect of registration would be such that after registration, the owner would
be protected against unauthorised copying which would result in any loss of
actual or potential market share. This is provided the database using the copied
information falls within the same class. Therefore, at the time of registration,
owners will have to be careful and register the database in all classes in which
they propose to exploit the data. This requirement is necessary to limit the
scope, to prevent abuse of a dominant position and to encourage innovation in
secondary markets. The data in the protected database can be used by secondary
market players, where the use does not affect the actual or potential market of
the database owner, provided the owner has not registered his database in that
class as well. In fact, the ECJ has held that the abuse of a dominant position
may arise where copyright is used to prevent the development of a new, valueadded product for a secondary market, not offered by the right holders
themselves.158 Secondary market players will also be able to demonstrate that a
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value-added product is being provided via their activities. Like in the IMS case,159
such grounds involve that:
z

The product protected by copyright must be indispensable to compete in
the secondary market;

z

The refusal to license copyright must prevent the emergence of a new
product for which there is a potential consumer demand;

z

The refusal must not be justified by objective considerations; and

z

It must be likely to eliminate all competition in the secondary market.160
VI. CONCLUSION

Any responsible database protection measure must take into account the
customary practices of scientists and knowledge-sharing.161 Such practices are
intrinsic to the continuance of our information society. Indeed, in an information
society, information is both consumed as well produced by such communities.
Also, in an age of digital technology, there are two reasons why digital technology
will contribute to a revolution in value-added uses of databases. First, digital
technology has the potential to disaggregate the value-added functions of
databases,162 and second, that digital technologies can bring to the fore
completely different kinds of functions altogether.163 A combination of the need
to protect and the need to preserve, as it were, questions our fundamental
assumptions about the notion of property and the requirement for protection of
data.
India’s status as a new information economy seems to necessitate database
regulation. Our participation in an international framework for such protection
159
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cannot be limited to simply being a consumer of models that are in force in
other jurisdictions. India must take into account the pitfalls that accompany
enacting similar proposals. As already noted, the WIPO study proposes that
India adopt a similar regime to the sui generis regime adopted in the European
Union.164 As a matter of information policy, it is necessary for the government
to involve discussions from various stakeholders. We hope that the model that
we have suggested might provide one of many starting points for discussion.
Importantly, policy makers and legislators must realise that intellectual property
reform does not always mean addition, but may sometimes mean substitution,
even if that substitution lessens the protection already available. Indeed, as
Lawrence Lessig notes,

“Overregulation stifles creativity. It smothers innovation. It gives dinosaurs
a veto over the future. It wastes the extraordinary opportunity for a
democratic creativity that digital technology enables.”
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